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PEERING INTO THE COURTROOM:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
INTRODUCTION
Defining the public interest in open judicial proceedings is an
uncertain task. Various rationales have been offered, each having
some merit in its own right.' The extent of this public interest has
arisen in a broad spectrum of cases. Recently decided issues have in-
cluded questions of access to court records' and prior restraints on
publication.' While access rights to pretrial suppression hearings
have been denied,' the Court has recognized a public right of access
to trials.' These cases help to illustrate the conflict between the con-
stitutional guarantees of free press and fair trial in the guise of
access to court proceedings.
1. See, e.g., notes 19, 34-40, 48-50, 63-79 infra and accompanying text.
2. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). In Cox, an action
was brought against a broadcasting company for the publication of a deceased rape vic-
tim's name. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding that the first amend-
ment protects the press when information appearing in public records is published ac-
curately.
3. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). In Landmark, a state statute pro-
hibited the divulgence of information concerning the state judicial review commission
proceedings. Upon publishing truthful information regarding one such proceeding, a
newspaper was convicted of violating the statute. In reversing the conviction, the
Court found that the first amendment barred penalties against strangers to the pro-
ceedings who published truthful accounts. Nebraska Press dealt with the imposition of
a "gag" order by the trial court, which had found that the fair trial of the defendant
might be jeopardized by unrestricted reporting of the pretrial proceedings. This order
was invalidated by the Court as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the freedom of
the press.
4. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). In Gannett,
Judge DePasquale ruled in favor of a defense motion to close a pretrial suppression
hearing, on the grounds that an open hearing would damage the defendants' fair trial
rights. The Court affirmed the order, finding no independent right of access for the
public.
5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. 2814
(1980). At the fourth trial of the defendant, a defense motion to close the trial was
granted by the trial court, without any definitive findings as to the risk to the defen-
dant's fair trial. Reversing the Virginia court, the Supreme Court found a first amend-
ment right of the public to open trials, absent an overriding interest specified in find-
ings by the court.
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This note addresses the public interest in judicial proceedings,
especially the pretrial suppression hearing. Fulfilling this interest
requires access to the courts, so that the public can acquire the in-
formation it needs regarding judicial proceedings.' Two possible con-
stitutional routes can arguably provide the public with an access
right. First, the public trial guarantee of the sixth amendment might
apply to furnish a right of access.7 Second, the involvement of first
amendment rights could mandate a public right of access to judicial
proceedings! Additionally, there are public interests which arise
from the operation of the Exclusionary Rule9 in suppression hear-
ings that intimate a right of access for public and press."0
In discussing the public interest in judicial proceedings, an
initial review of the public right of access to trials is in order. This
review will consider both the first and sixth amendment approaches
in support of such a right. The analysis then turns to the basic
operation and underlying premises of the Exclusionary Rule. Finally,
the inquiry looks into the public interest in access to pretrial pro-
ceedings, including the suppression hearing.
THE PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO TRIALS
In analyzing public access rights to Exclusionary Rule hearings,
a threshold question is whether the public has any right of access
to judicial proceedings. There are two ways in which this question
can be approached. Applying the sixth amendment public trial right
provides one basis for public access." The second approach is based
upon the first amendment concept of public participation. 2 Before
the Supreme Court, the latter argument has been more persuasive,' 3
6. See notes 63-82 infra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 15-32 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 33-92 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 93-120 infra and accompanying text. Basically the Exclusionary
Rule requires the courts to find evidence that is seized by public officials in violation of
a defendant's constitutional rights inadmissible in a criminal trial.
10. See notes 215-25 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 15-32 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 33-92 infra and accompanying text.
13. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. at
2830, the Court held that a criminal trial must be open to the public under the first
amendment. On the other hand, the Court rejected a public right to attend pretrial
and trial proceedings under the sixth amendment in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. at 384-91. However, the discussion in Gannett, although rejecting such a right
to attend trials, should be read narrowly in terms of the issue presented, namely the
closure of a pretrial suppression hearing. Id. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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and also affords the better foundation for public access rights to
pretrial proceedings.
Public Access Under the Public Trial Guarantee
Although the sixth amendment guarantee of a public trial
literally applies only to the accused," there is some support for an
underlying public interest in keeping court proceedings presump-
tively open to the public. This is implicit in the determination by
the Court that although a defendant may waive his right to a public
trial, he may not compel a private trial. 7 The preferences of the in-
dividual defendant are not necessarily controlling on the trial court
when a motion for closure is made.' Thus, societal interests appear
to exist which require open trials, and are distinct from the in-
terests of a defendant. 9
14. See notes 176-205 infra and accompanying text.
15. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
1308 (1978). See generally Note, The 'Right' to Observe Trials-Its Source and Vin-
dication, 31 IND. L.J. 377 (1956). As well as the more general societal interest in justice,
the public interests which underlie the sixth amendment are personal to all members
of society insofar as they might be subjected to the criminal process.
17. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 382. "While the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees to a defendant in a criminal case the right to a public trial, it does
not guarantee the right to compel a private trial." The dissenters in Gannett were
even more emphatic in rejecting any possibility that a defendant could compel a
closure. Interpreting the common-law history of the public trial guarantee, the
dissenters would have required a full hearing prior to any closure to protect the public
interests in maintaining open judicial proceedings. Id at 415-33. Cf. Singer v. United
States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965) (interpreting the right to an impartial trial by jury).
18. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 382-83 & nn. 11 & 12. The
Court clearly indicated that if either the prosecutor or the trial judge objected to a
closure motion the hearing would remain open. But a member of society could not
similarly object, since an independent right to open proceedings did not extend to the
public. The participants were deemed sufficient representatives of the public interest.
19. Some of these interests include: protecting trial integrity; guarding
against partiality for either side; deciding criminal prosecutions on complete and
truthful records; scrutinizing police and prosecutor; maintaining confidence in the
courts; and developing the educational role of the courts. See Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 427-29 (dissenting opinion). Open trials also provide unknown
witnesses the chance to come forward, and discourage perjury by witnesses by making
them testify before the community. Id at 383 (majority opinion).
1981]
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Other sixth amendment rights have similar dual natures, where
a defendant has a guaranteed right but may not compel the con-
verse of that right." For example, the societal interest in swift and
speedy trials may conflict with the interests of a particular defen-
dant,21 but the defendant may not delay his trial indefinitely.22
Furthermore, the defendant does not have an unqualified right to
demand a bench trial because of the traditional importance of the
jury and its role as a fact-finder." The failure to permit a waiver by
a defendant of his rights does not deprive him of those rights, but
his ability to compel a waiver could be adverse to social interests
embodied in the sixth amendment."
Contrary to the concept of societal interests implicit in the
sixth amendment is the viewpoint that the sixth amendment
guarantees are personal to the accused.15 Any societal interests in-
volved in open trials do not rise to the level of a public right of ac-
cess.26 Instead, the public trial right is for the benefit of the defen-
dant for his own protection.' A traditional distrust of secret pro-
20. "The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with
it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S.
at 34-35, quoted in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 382 (majority opinion);
id. at 417 (dissenting opinion). Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (right
not to have counsel). In Faretta, the Court found a right not to have counsel based on
an accepted and well-established right of self-representation. Assistance of counsel was
a procedural right to further the personal right of self-representation. Still, the right
to counsel can only be waived with the consent of the court.
21. Cf. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1971) (the Court recognized that
the speedy trial right was "generically different from" any other Constitutional right
protecting the accused).
22. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974, § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1977). Paragraph
9(A) provides for continuances only if the ends of justice outweigh the best interests of
the public and defendant, and the judge must specify what ends are found.
23. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, at 26, 34 (1965); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1929); 3 BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES* 380 (jurors are the
"best investigators of truth, and surest guardians of public justice").
24. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. at 36. See, e.g., note 19 supra
25. E.g., Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 368; cf. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. at 819 (the accused has a personal right to make his defense under
the sixth amendment).
26. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 382-90. But the dissent, in
reviewing the history of public trials, found that the sixth amendment prohibited a
closure without a full hearing on the public right to an open proceeding. Id. at 419-33
(dissenting opinion).
27. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 380-81; In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 270 (1948). "[The public trial] guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard
against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution."
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ceedings formed the basis for this guarantee, 8 and the presence of a
public watchdog is intended to prevent any abuses of the judicial
system. An additional obstacle to any public access right under the
sixth amendment is the jury, which protects any societal interests in
judicial proceedings as well as furthering the right of the defendant
to a fair trial.
Originally, the community itself was obligated to discover the
truth. As a governmental system developed to discover and pro-
secute crimes, the jury preserved this public participation in the
criminal process.' Appeals to the public, as represented by the
jurors, enable a defendant to protect himself from persecution." In
fact, Justice Brennan preferred the protection of the jury because
"the Constitution, in the context of adult criminal trials, has re-
jected the notion that public trial is an adequate substitution for
trial by jury in serious cases."'" Selection procedures aid in impanel-
ling an impartial jury, and that jury is then subject to court control
and certain rules which operate to insure a verdict based solely on
the trial proceedings.2 Thus, a jury is better suited to protect a
defendant and render an impartial verdict than a courtroom of
potentially biased or vindictive spectators.
Although there is support for the recognition of societal in-
terests under the sixth amendment which indicate a need for public
access, prevailing authority denies the existence of such a right. But
even if the public trial guarantee does not provide a public access
28. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). "The traditional Anglo-American
distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of [certain
secret proceedings]." Id. at 268. "In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret pro-
ceedings, their inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our
federal and state governments that criminal trials be public," id. at 273, fourteenth
amendment due process requires respect for a defendant's public trial right. Cf. Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. - 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (recognizing
the public character of judicial proceedings on first amendment grounds).
29. See Note, 31 IND. L.J., supra note 16, at 379.
30. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part). McKeiver dealt with the issue of requiring juries in
juvenile proceedings. Brennan argued that either a jury or a public trial had to be pro-
vided in juvenile cases, which suggests that the two rights are nearly synonymous.
Thus, an appeal to the community which arouses public indignation, offers a protection
similar to a jury trial.
31. Id at 555.
32. Some common controls include: voir dire, the oath taken by the jurors,
the setting apart of the jury from other spectators and participants, orders for jurors
not to discuss the case with others, jury instructions and private deliberations at the
conclusion of the trial.
1981]
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right, the societal interests under the sixth amendment are more
forcefully cognizable under the first amendment as reasons for a
public right of access. Public interests arise under that amendment
beyond those implicit in the sixth amendment, and independent of
the interests of a defendant. To define a public right of access under
the auspices of the first amendment, some of those interests and
their treatment by the Court will be explored.
The First Amendment Right of Access
In defining a public right of access under the first amendment,"
several matters must be discussed. The constitutional bar on prior
restraints must be examined since it protects the press' role as an
agent distributing information to the public. But this role necessari-
ly involves a need to gather information, raising the issue of denied
access to information. Furthermore, the functions which access
would fulfill must be ascertained to support a public right of access.
Initially, an exploration of a public right of access brings forward
the underlying concept of the public right to know.
An important concept underlying a right of access is the public
right to know what transpires in the governmental processes; this
enables the intelligent exercise of the right of participation in
government.' Public participation is best served by the exchange of
ideas forming the basis for intelligent and informed decision-making,
thus "there is practically universal agreement that a major premise
of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs." 5 Public decision-making should not be limited
to information filtered through governmental agents who might
benefit from "decisions" based on that information. Instead, the
"profound national commitment that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open '" must be protected under
33. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. - 100 S. Ct. at
2833 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring). See generally Note, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971); Comment, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975).
35. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Mills dealt with a newspaper's
right to publish an editorial favoring a particular candidate on election day, without
being penalized by a state statute. Accord, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. at 2826-27.
36. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 7
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the first amendment to perpetuate the "uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.
3 7
The freedom of speech and debate also mandates a right to
receive information, for without the right to hear what others are
allowed to say, there can be no meaningful debate or discussion." How-
ever, this right to know and discuss depends upon means of
distributing information. Reliance on the press to distribute informa-
tion is necessary for intelligent and informed participation in govern-
ment because the individual has neither the time nor the resources to
observe the government and bring the information obtained before the
public. 9 Freedom of the press is not measured by the printing of words
in a pamphlet, but by the public rights which a free press serves and
represents. By acting as an agent of the public, the press preserves the
"free flow of information" crucial to knowledgeable public participa-
tion. '° Publication of information is essential for the public to receive in-
formation, and therefore the public relies on the press as its agent to
communicate its discoveries.
Because the public relies on the press for information, the law
abhors prior restraints on publication of knowledge held by the
press as unconstitutional abridgements of the freedom of the press."'
However, the prior restraint doctrine also ordinarily presumes that
the information was within the public domain when gathered by the
press for publication.'2 State sanctions on the accurate publication of
a rape victim's name have been rejected where the information was
available through judicial records open to public inspection.'" A
pretrial order restraining press publications to protect the defen-
dant's fair trial rights failed to overcome the barriers to prior
restraints, and was found invalid by the Supreme Court in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart." Not only was the press attending an
37. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 774 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). The majority did not disagree with Marshall's assertion that the "freedom to
speak and freedom to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin." Id at
775. In fact, the Court did not reach the first amendment issue in making its decision.
39. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975).
40. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
41. Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713. 714 (1971) (per curiam); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
42. See, e.g., notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.
43. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
44. 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976). The Court applied Judge Learned Hand's "clear
and present danger test": whether "the gravity of the 'evil', discounted by its im-
1981l
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open proceeding, but the order failed to distinguish between the
sources of the information which could easily have included the
public record. Another pretrial order enjoining the publication of a
juvenile's name or picture was rejected by the Court when the press
had obtained the information at a pretrial detention hearing without
objections from the judge or attorneys." Furthermore, when a
newspaper published reports concerning a judicial commission's in-
quiry about a judge, the Supreme Court reversed its conviction for
violating the statute for secrecy of commission proceedings because
the media was a stranger to the inquiry and beyond the justifiable
reach of the statute."' This expands the "public domain" concept to
include all information held by the press which the government
seeks to suppress. But, as Justice Stewart observed, while publica-
tion of information may not be punishable, the government could
deny access to the commission proceedings.'
Denial of access to information raises the spectre of a right to
gather information." "A corollary of the right to publish must be the
right to gather information,"" since the former is useless without
the latter, and the free flow of information is even more effectively
impaired when access is completely denied than when a prior
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
Id. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 217 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd 341
U.S. 494 (1951)). Several factors considered by the Court included the nature and ex-
tent of pretrial news coverage, alternative measures to mitigate the effects of pretrial
publicity, and the effectiveness of a restraining order in preventing the danger to the
defendant's fair trial. See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
45. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 480 U.S. 308 (1977) (per
curiam).
46. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 837-38. The
statute could penalize parties to the inquiry who divulged information from the pro-
ceedings, but the state's interests were insufficient to justify encroachment on the first
amendment. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Even
though the "Pentagon Papers" had been illegally obtained, but not by the newspaper
company, the Court rejected the prohibition on publication because the government
failed to demonstrate sufficient justification to overcome the presumption against prior
restraints.
47. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 848-49 (Stewart,
J., concurring).
48. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. 2814.
"This is a watershed case.... [Today the Court has] squarely held that the acquisition
of newsworthy matter is entitled to . . . constitutional protection." Id. at -, 100 S.
Ct. at 2830 (Stevens, J., concurring). See Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Infor-
mation Under the First Amendment, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 357 (1978). See also Note, 71
COLuM. L. RaV. 838, note 34 supra.
49. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1981], Art. 7
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restraint is imposed on publication. Therefore, newsgathering should
be accorded some first amendment protection, for "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."'
But this right to attend does not qualify the press for special
consideration. 1 The right to speak and publish does not include an
unrestrained right to gather information, since the press has no
special rights of access greater than those of the general public."
Therefore, the right of access for the press can be defined in terms
of the rights of the general public.
Comparing the access permitted to members of the public with
that of the press, the Court upheld prison rules prohibiting inter-
views with designated inmates." Prison officials had allowed general
press access to the prison exceeding the general access rights of the
public. The court found these restrictions valid since the press did
not have a special right to conduct the interviews."' Nor were the
prisoners' challenges on first amendment grounds sufficient to over-
come the prison regulations when considered in light of the legiti-
50. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). Accord, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. at 2829 (citation omitted). "We hold that the right
to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without
the freedom to attend such trials .... important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of
the press could be eviscerated.'" See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 (1974). See
also Comment, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166, note 24 supra.
51. E.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In Zurcher, the Court
upheld the search of a student newspaper pursuant to a valid warrant obtained after
showing probable cause for the search, specificity, and reasonableness. The press has
no special procedures or exceptions extended to it, but is treated the same as the
public. Id. at 568-70 (Powell, J., concurring). However, the dissenters argued for rever-
sal because the constitutional function of informing the public would be impaired. Id. at
571-72 (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
52. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978). In Nixon,
the Court upheld the denial of physical access to the tapes used as evidence at the
trial of the Watergate defendants, since the public never had a right of access to the
tapes themselves. Transcripts and open proceedings provided sufficient access to fulfill
the public right to know. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). The government's refusal to
validate Zemel's passport was upheld by the Court as an inhibition only of action and
not of first amendment rights. But see id. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas'
perspective found first amendment rights coupled with conduct, and he argued that
the freedom of ideas must not be abridged by restrictions on conduct.
53. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974).
54. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 831; Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
at 847. But see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 841 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co., 817 U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissents would have
rejected the restrictions on interviews as contrary to the public right to know.
1981]
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mate objectives of the penal system.6 The restrictions on access
were imposed for security considerations and did not deny access to
sources available to the general public." However, the Court did im-
ply that its finding neither attempts to conceal prison conditions nor
obstructions to press investigating and reporting of conditions was a
factor in upholding the restrictions, and thus suggested a public
right to know about the prisons."
This public right to know about the management of the prisons
involves a right of access. The Court, however, denied a constitu-
tional right of access to prisons based on public importance and the
media's role to provide information in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.'
Sheriff Houchins had allowed public tours of the prison with the
press included as members of the public, but some areas remained
off-limits and cameras were not permitted inside the prison. While
reaffirming the equal access rights of press and public, the Court ex-
tended its earlier prison decisions59 from case-by-case limitations on
interviews to general prohibitions on access to prisons and com-
munications with prisoners.' Prison officials were under no constitu-
tional duty to disclose information within their control, and even if
such a duty did exist the Court found standards for disclosure to be
deficient."
55. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822-23. These objectives include: deterring
crime by isolating offenders from society, protecting society from offenders, rehabilita-
tion so prisoners may return to society, and institutional considerations of security.
56. Id at 834-35. See generally Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, -
U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. at 2832-33 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring). "Read with care
and in context, our decisions must therefore be understood as holding only that any
privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dic-
tated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security or con-
fidentiality."
57. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. at 848.
58. 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). However, Houchins was only a four-three decision
with Justices Blackmun and Marshall not participating. Additionally, Justice Stewart
would have permitted cameras in those areas open to public tours to better effectuate
the press role to inform the public. Thus, Stewart sought greater flexibility in defining
equal access in accordance with the press' role. Id at 16-19.
59. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417
U.S. 843 (1974).
60. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 27-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 14. The Court apparently considered access a means to avail oneself
of the duty to disclose, and rejected the demands for access to the prison. See Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 383 (majority opinion); Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 839. See also Note, Statutory and Judicial Responses to
the Problem of Access to Government Information, 1971 DET. C.L. REv. 51 (1979). Find-
ing that the courts are not allowing access under the Constitution, this note reviews
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If access to judicial proceedings is similarly dependent on a
duty of the courts to disclose information, then the source of that
duty must be considered. Houchins rejected a right of access which
rested on the public right to know about the prisons, since there
was no constitutional duty to disclose information within govern-
ment control. However, this approach goes too far towards negating
the public right to know, since the duty to disclose is based on that
constitutional right"' rather than vice versa. Thus the existence of a
right of access to judicial proceedings should depend on the public
right to know.
In determining the public right to know what transpires within
the judicial system, the substantive grounds favoring open trials
must be defined. Interests in public scrutiny of governmental affairs
are protected by the first amendment. The performance of the
courtroom participants certainly should be no exception.13 Many, if
not most, judges and prosecutors are elected officials, whose actions
should be assessed by the public." Thus the public needs access for
observation and first-hand knowledge which accompanies their right
to remove incompetent judges and prosecutors. Information on the
criminal system "appears to be of critical importance to our type of
government in which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper
conduct of public business."' Without the means to observe the pro-
the legislative responses setting forth standards on disclosure and access in the
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act of 1974.
62. See notes 33-40 supra and accompanying text.
63. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2814.
"These expressly guaranteed freedoms [of the first amendment] share a common core
purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning
of government." Id. at ___, 100 S. Ct. at 2826-27. "Under our system, judges are not
mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordinate branch of govern-
ment.... Thus, so far as the trial is the mechanism for judicial factfinding, as well as
the initial forum for legal decisionmaking, it is a genuine governmental proceeding."
Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2838 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring). "The operations of
the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. at 839. See also notes 33-35 supra
and accompanying text.
64. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. .. 100 S. Ct. at
2836-38 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring). Open judicial proceedings are necessary
for public control over government, and "public access to trials acts as an important
check, akin in purpose to the other checks and balances that infuse our system of
government." Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2838. See Note, 31 IND. L.J. 377, note 16 supra.
See also BLACKSTONE, note 48 supra. Blackstone suggested that the jury system pro-
vided some control over the officials by preserving some administration of justice in
the hands of the people.
65. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 495. See generally Note,
Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public Access to Judicial Pro-
ceedings, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978); Note, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 357, note 48 supra.
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cess and make its own analysis, the public cannot offer constructive
criticism or formulate any basis for its judgments.
In addition to the public participation aspect, there is a general
societal interest in unbiased criminal prosecutions decided on com-
plete and truthful records." Open trials assure that procedural
rights are preserved, and that justice is dispensed equally without
partiality. 7 Also, open proceedings aid factfinding by improving the
quality of testimony and inducing witnesses to come forward."
Therefore the public right to know is manifested by the need for in-
formation not only to enable effective public participation, but also
to secure the disclosure of the complete truth in judicial pro-
ceedings.
Besides these substantive benefits of open courts, various
sociological or ritual functions are also fulfilled by allowing public
access." One such function is to demonstrate the fairness of the
system.70 Public confidence in the judicial system requires openness
so that the public can appreciate how the system serves the ends of
justice. "Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is
to achieve the objective of maintaining public confidence in the ad-
ministration of justice."71 Closed proceedings hinder the public
perception of the trial process' performance by denying access to
observe and arrive at a conclusion on its acceptability, and pro-
pagate the "traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret pro-
66. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 427-28 (dissenting opinion).
Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (press helps guarantee
fairness of trials).
67. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. __ 100 S. Ct. at
2823-24. "Open trials play a fundamental role in our judicial system to assure the
criminal defendant a fair and accurate adjudication .... Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2837
(Brennen & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
68. "Publicizing trial proceedings aids accurate factfinding. . . . And ex-
perience has borne out these assertions about the truth-finding role of publicity." Id. at
__ 100 S. Ct. at 2838-39 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
This fulfills Justice Brennan's principle that "the value of access must be measured in
specifics." Id at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2824. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at
383 (majority opinion).
69. See Note, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899, note 65 supra.
70. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. at
2823-24. The necessity that the people believe they are equitably governed "mandates
a system of justice that demonstrates the fairness of the law to our citizens.... Open
trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afford-
ed equally." Id at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2837 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
71. Id. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2837 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); Gan-
nett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 429 (dissenting opinion).
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ceedings."72 Thus, violations of the tradition of openness"3 for the
courts can damage confidence in the judicial system.
Related to the confidence it instills in the courts, openness may
also serve a "significant community therapeutic value."7 A trial pro-
vides an outlet for the community concern following the commission
of a crime." Closure cuts off this outlet, and the public could con-
ceivably turn to "self-help" in settling disputes or handing out
revenge or retribution." The acceptance of judicial processes for the
arbitration of disputes may be a crucial social function served by
open trials.
Another function of openness is the development of social
values. The acceptance of the judicial processes is one such social
value.77 Without the ability to observe the system and its function-
ing, its inherent values cannot be passed on to the public."8 The
ritualized nature of the courts helps to promote belief in, and accep-
tance of, those values.79 Access is needed to develop those values,
72. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 268. "Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice
and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law." Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. at 2837 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concur-
ring).
73. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 2814.
The Court considered the historical importance of open proceedings at length. Cf. Gan-
nett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (the Court reviewed the history of open
judicial proceedings under the sixth amendment).
74. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. __, 100 S. Ct. at 2824.
75. Id at -, 100 S. Ct. at 2823-25.
76. "Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are
underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated. . . . '[But]
accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much perhaps as the execution of punish-
ment, operate[ ] to restore the imbalance which was created by the offense .. . " Id. at
__., 100 S. Ct. at 2824 (citation omitted). The ritual and solemnity which permeate a
criminal prosecution certainly have an impact on the public, and hopefully satisfy the
public demands for justice. See notes 74 & 75 supra.
77. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
78. Social values are implicit in concepts such as: equal protection of the law,
fair and impartial trial on the merits, innocence until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, government of laws, and stability and predictability in application of
the law. Cf. note 221 infra (values inherent in the operation of the Exclusionary Rule).
79. Procedures which apply to all defendants equally, such as the formal
charge and arraignment process, the court rules which are expressly set forth for all
proceedings, as well as the formalities of conduct and decorum which should be observed
in all judicial proceedings, better demonstrate values like fairness, equality and
stability than would variable procedures. See FED. R. CRIM. P.; IND. R. CRIM. P. See also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *379. Blackstone noted that although jurors avoided the
risk of bias by judges to others of similar rank, judges were still required to apply the
rules of law to prevent "wild and capricious" decisions by the jurors.
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and effectuate the other functions served by open judicial pro-
ceedings.
Since not all members of the public can have access to the
courts, the press role of reporting is crucial to effectuate the public
rights involved in open courts. "A trial is a public event. What
transpires in the courtroom is public property."' ° Therefore, press
coverage is merely a means of transmitting public information. Ac-
cess should not be denied. "The commission of crime, prosecution
resulting from it, and judicial proceedings resulting from the pro-
secutions, however, are without question events of legitimate con-
cern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of
the press to report the operations of government."81 However, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the press also bears a duty to ex-
ercise its protected first amendment rights responsibly by trying to
protect the defendant's fair trial rights.'
Because of the jeopardy to the fair trial of a defendant, restric-
tions on press coverage have been recognized by the Court. Justice
Douglas rejected the use of the contempt power when freedom of
speech and press were involved unless the statements posed a
serious hazard to the administration of justice." However, the Court
has recognized that the trial judge can restrict the press in his court
to preserve the decorum and integrity during criminal proceedings."
Because of the public right to be informed of court proceedings
"maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying on this
important function in a democratic society [but] its exercise must
necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in the
judicial process."" The earlier decisions of the Court, however,
focused on cases of egregious misconduct or distraction by the press
coverage." Later, the Court began to erode that view by emphasiz-
80. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1946).
81. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975).
82. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 (1976).
83. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1946). In Craig, a reporter had gained the
information from a public court proceeding. Because the trial judge sought to deter-
mine what the reporter could communicate by use of the contempt power, the Court
held the prior restraint invalid unless there was a "serious and imminent threat" to
the defendant's fair trial. Id. at 373.
84. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1964).
85. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1964). Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1965). Press coverage of judicial proceedings "must be limited when it is apparent
that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged." Id. at 358.
86. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1965). In spite of the circus at-
mosphere in Sheppard, the Court never suggested a closed trial. The limits on the
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ing the fair trial right more than the right of access. In Branzburg v.
Hayes,8 the Court stated that "Newsmen may be prohibited from at-
tending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions
are necessary to assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartial
tribunal.""u Unlike prohibition on publication which is subject to the
prior restraint doctrine,"9 closure of the trial has been declared con-
stitutional on sixth amendment grounds to protect the defendant's
fair trial rights.'
Closures, even to protect the defendant's fair trial, have essen-
tially the same effect as prior restraints."1 Closures prevent publica-
tion of information within the public domain by obstructing
coverage of court proceedings. This circumvents the public right to
know how the courts are performing, and hinders public participa-
tion in the judicial system. While the press has no greater right of
access to the courts than the public, its role as an agent of the
public requires access to fulfill the functions served by open trials.
Because of this public interest in open trials, the courts must at-
tempt to avoid closure." The question remains, however, whether
the public has a similar interest in open pretrial proceedings.
press coverage were confined to that conduct disrupting the proceedings, rather than
denying access and preventing coverage. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1964). Televi-
sion coverage of Billie Sol Estes' trial over defense objections was grounds for reversal
under the Due Process Clause. In reaching its decision, the Court only rejected the use
of videotaping and not access to the trial. "It is true that the public has a right to be
informed as to what occurs in its courts, but reporters of all media, including televi-
sion, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever
occurs in open court." Id at 541-42.
87. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
88. Id. at 685.
89. See notes 41-47 supra and accompanying text.
90. Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 391. However, the facts and narrow
issue presented in Gannett dealt only with pretrial proceedings, and the Court never
reached first amendment issues in its decision. See also Nebraksa Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Although its decision rested on the prior restraint doctrine,
the Court implied that closures of preliminary hearings were acceptable alternatives if
permitted by state law. Id. at 568.
91. Technically, prior restraints deal solely with preventing publication of in-
formation from any source, while closure is only a restriction on a single source of in-
formation and not on publication.
92. Chief Justice Burger would require an overriding interest articulated in
findings before permitting a criminal trial to be closed to the public. Also, the trial
court must review alternatives such as sequestering witnesses or jurors. Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. - , 100 S. Ct. at 2830. Cf. Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-65 (regarding the use of prior restraints, or .gag"
orders).
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A REVIEW OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
A careful examination of the basis and rationale of the Exclu-
sionary Rule implicates first amendment interests which prescribe a
right of access to suppression hearings. Rather than the protection
of the defendant, societal values and interests are far more impor-
tant in Supreme Court opinions. Restrictions on access encumber
these values and interests, and only serve to heighten the potency
of critics of the Rule. To understand the Rule and its role in the
criminal justice system, a roadmap of its development is necessary.
History of the Exclusionary Rule
Two types of evidence form the basis for the development of
the Exclusionary Rule. The two types are: first, coerced confessions,
second, "hard" evidence obtained through unlawful searches and
seizures.93 Coerced confessions were originally excluded on four-
teenth amendment grounds." Later decisions, however, extended
the fifth amendment grounds used in federal courts to exclude all
coerced confessions in all courts.95 Exclusion of "hard" evidence
unlawfully seized was uniformly required in the federal courts long
before being applied to state courts under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments." Recently, the Court has withdrawn in the search and
seizure cases, reflecting some dissatisfaction with the exclusion of
"hard" evidence.9 7
While recent decisions have disparaged the Rule in cases deal-
ing with fourth amendment violations, it is still supported in cases
of coerced confessions. In Brown v. Mississippi,99 a murder suspect
was whipped until he "confessed." The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, finding that the confession was obtained in violation of
the fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause.99 Applying the Due
Process Exclusionary Rule the Court has excluded incriminating
statements 0 and confessions,'"' obtained by pressuring the defen-
dant and not following appropriate procedures. Thus the Due Pro-
93. For example, weapons or narcotics are hard evidence since they have an
independent identity that cannot be denied, but can be proven by objective means.
94. See notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text.
95. See notes 102-05 infra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 106-15 infra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 116-20 infra and accompanying text.
98. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
99. Id. at 287.
100. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
101. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).
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cess Clause was sufficient for excluding coerced confessions before
the fifth amendment was made applicable to the states.
Long before applying the fifth amendment to the states, the
Supreme Court excluded confessions from federal courts when ob-
tained in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.' 2 In
1964, the Court extended the privilege to state proceedings by incor-
poration under the fourteenth amendment. 3 To safeguard that
privilege, the Court set out procedures for officials to follow when
questioning persons in official custody.' These "Miranda warnings"
were adjudged necessary to avoid the compulsion to talk which is in-
herent in "custodial interrogations.'"05 Thus, in all state and federal
courts, coerced confessions are excluded under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.
While confessions usually fall within fifth amendment applica-
tions of the Rule, evidence obtained from unlawful searches and sei-
zures is excluded on fourth amendment grounds."6 Evidence seized
by a United States marshall without search or arrest warrants was
held inadmissible in federal court in Weeks v. United States. 7 Nor
was evidence obtained with a "valid" warrant or subpeona admis-
sible when the warrant or subpoena was founded on a fourth amend-
ment violation." 8 This extension of the Exclusionary Rule beyond
evidence itself seized unlawfully is commonly referred to as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," from a case where illegally obtained
wiretap evidence was offered in a federal court.' Unlike the confes-
102. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897). The test of volun-
tariness applied by the Court looked to the confession itself and its freedom fror-
threats, promises, or improper influences, not whether the conduct of the officials was
shocking. See also Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
103. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965). After an arrest, "Miranda warn-
ings" must be given to the arrestee before questioning by officials. The defendant/ar-
restee must be informed that:
He has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
105. Id. at 458.
106. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
108. E.g., Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
109. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). But see Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In Olmstead, the Court held that wiretap evidence
was not obtained by a search and seizure, ignoring the illegality of the wiretap under
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sion cases, the state courts did not apply a Due Process Exclu-
sionary Rule to unlawfully seized evidence. Incorporation of the
fourth amendment through the fourteenth did not extend the Rule
to the states, and the court expressly rejected such incorporation of
the,Rule in Wolf v. Colorado."'
After applying the Exclusionary Rule in federal courts for
nearly fifty years and rejecting its application to state courts, the
Court demonstrated a changing viewpoint. Two decisions are in-
dicative of this change. In one the court applied the Exclusionary
Rule under the fourteenth amendment to exclude evidence seized
through shocking methods."' In the second the Court excluded
evidence offered in federal courts when unlawfully obtained by state
officials."' In Mapp v. Ohio"' the Court finally held that "all
evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Con-
stitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.""'
Even confessions, when resulting from unlawful arrests, fall under
the penumbra of the Rule and are excluded on that basis. Even the
use of "Miranda warnings" does not break the causal claim in cases
of fourth, rather than fifth amendment violations." 5 Therefore, all
evidence resulting directly or indirectly from fourth amendment
violations is excluded in all judicial proceedings.
In recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has dis-
counted the applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to all evidence in
all proceedings. Stressing the deterrent rationale for the "judicially
created remedy," the Court refused to apply the Rule in grand jury
state law. Nardone did not overrule Olmstead, but applied the Communications Act of
1934 in determining that the evidence was illegally obtained.
110. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
111. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Pumping the defendant's stomach
violated the Due Process Clause, and the evidence was excluded. However, the Court's
decision construed the evidence as a coerced confession. Clearly, both the drugs seized
and the methods used could be described as the fruit of an unlawful search and
seizure.
112. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). Previously, evidence seized
unlawfully by state officials was admitted in federal courts. In Elkins the Court removed
that disparity, and used the Rule to enforce the fourth amendment guarantees by ex-
cluding the evidence in federal courts.
113. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
114. Id. at 655. The Exclusionary Rule thus became applicable in state courts
as well as federal courts, whenever the fourth amendment was violated by officials.
115. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-03 (1975). A statement obtained from
an unlawful arrest is inadmissible even when Miranda warnings are given to the defen-
dant. This is because the evidence is not considered a coerced confession, but the
result of an unlawful seizure of the defendant.
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proceedings."" A year later, the Court initiated the use of a subjec-
tive standard by requiring suppression of evidence "only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge . . . that the
search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.'. 7 This
standard clearly departed from the more objective "all evidence"
standard enunciated in Mapp v. Ohio."8 Additionally, the Court
restricted the use of the Rule in habeas corpus petitions to federal
courts seeking reversal of state convictions in Stone v. Powell."9
Once the state provided an equitable hearing on the defendant's
claims of a fourth amendment violation, the Rule could not be used
on appeal to federal courts. As a result, less supervision may be ex-
ercised by the federal courts over state applications of the Rule."
With less supervision over state court applications of the Rule,
greater variations between the states could result. Flagrant abuses
by officials of defendants' constitutional rights will certainly con-
tinue, as will exclusion of evidence obtained by those abuses. The
Rule may, however, be used less frequently in the future to effec-
tuate fourth and fifth amendment guarantees. This can be surmised
from a review of criticism of the Exclusionary Rule, which reflects a
basic discontent with the Rule itself.
Criticism of the Exclusionary Rule
Discontented with the Rule, critics have attacked it from
various directions. One criticism is that the Rule raises side issues
which detract from the trial of a defendant.' Whether the Rule is
constitutionally mandated or merely a judicial rule of evidence is
116. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
117. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975).
118. See note 114 supra and accompanying text. But see Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. 590 (1975). Although in apparent contradiction with itself, just one day after
directing the subjective standard in Peltier, the Court stated that the Exclusionary
Rule was "directed at all unlawful searches and seizures." Id. at 603. This case can be
distinguished on its facts, however, since the seizure was an unlawful arrest.
Therefore, the search incident to the unlawful arrest automatically lacked probable
cause and the evidence obtained thereby had to be excluded. Justice Powell
distinguished the use of the Rule by the flagrant fourth amendment violations in
Brown as opposed by the technical abuses in Peltier. Id. at 610-12 (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
119. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
120. Id. at 494. See also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 11.7(f) at 751
(1978).
121. See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 561 (1975) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
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also a matter of dispute between advocates and critics of its applica-
tion." A third critique distinguishes involuntary confessions from
"real" evidence on the basis of reliability, 2 while another focuses on
a lack of deterrent effect." ' Finally, there is some question of the
benefits and relief obtained by use of the Rule. 1' Although not ex-
haustive, this list does serve to show some criticisms of the Rule
and its role in the criminal system.
The first criticism centers on the distraction a suppression
hearing causes from the defendant's trial to matters unrelated to his
guilt. Especially noticeable is the focus of the Rule on the question
of official misconduct, which is the determinate factor in the admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence. 26 However, this is not a major concern
to the Court, since it expanded the formula for the Rule from an ob-
jective determination of validity to a subjective knowledge of validi-
ty for a search by an official."2' The use of pretrial motions and sup-
pression hearings largely avoids this problem.'28 Even if the objec-
tion to admission of the evidence is made at trial, an in camera hear-
ing minimizes any distraction. While this can result in some delay,
the Rule deals with a fairly limited range of issues which the judge
should be able to dispose of easily." Another side effect of the Rule
is the possibility of better plea agreements offered to defendants
who can benefit from its application."3 However, the distractions
caused by the Exclusionary Rule should not justify much criticism,
because the purposes and values behind the Rule are almost entirely
separated from the individual defendant and his own guilt or in-
nocence.
181
Since the Rule is not designed for the defendant's benefit,
detractors claim it is merely judicially created and subject to
122. Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring) with
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 655.
123. E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
124. See Oaks, note 121 supra.
125. Id.; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
126. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
127. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. at 561 (Brennan, J., dissenting). By
making the knowledge of the officer part of the determination for applying the Rule,
the Court requires two findings before exclusion: illegality of the search, and the of-
ficer's awareness of that violation. This would tend to increase the potential for deflec-
ting the inquiries in the criminal trial from the guilt of the defendant to police miscon-
duct.
128. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3),
41(f).
129. See Oaks, supra note 121, at 747-48.
130. Id.
131. See notes 152-71 infra and accompanying text.
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judicial alterations, rather than constitutionally mandated. Recently,
the Supreme Court has adopted the belief that the "federal exclu-
sionary rule is not a command of the Fourth but is a judicially
created rule of evidence." ' This is a change from earlier cases
which implicitly recognized that the Rule was constitutionally
necessary and that the Constitution authorized the exclusion of
tainted evidence.' Whether judicial or constitutional, the Rule at-
tempts to protect all persons from unreasonable searches and
seizures and should be followed in the absence of a better rule.
13 4
The source of the Rule should not be grounds for repudiation. As
Professor Kamisar pointedly observed, tainted confessions are ex-
cluded under the Due Process Clause and the fifth amendment even
though neither mentions confessions of any kind. 3 This criticism of
the Rule is mere puffing, evading the real issues concerning how
well the Rule performs its function of effectuating constitutional
rights.
While criticism aimed at the source of the Rule evades the real
issues, there is some merit in the vilification of it because it ex-
cludes both coerced confessions and "hard," or "real," evidence
regardless of reliability. Chief Justice Burger supports this distinc-
tion, excluding coerced confessions because of their unreliability, but
seeking admission of "reliable" evidence because of its definite pro-
bative value.'3  But this seemingly logical distinction ignores the
long-established reasons for the Exclusionary Rule. 37 Involuntary
132. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring). Accord, Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 482; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 ("judicially
created remedy").
133. Note 114 supra and accompanying text. Accord, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Summing up the Weeks rule, the Court indicated that the
Rule protected fourth amendment rights by excluding evidence obtained through
fourth amendment violations. Id. at 462-63. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (re-
jecting the Rule's application to state courts). Wolf implied a constitutional basis for
the Rule by refusing to extend it while reasserting the position that the fourteenth
amendment did not incorporate the first eight amendments. See also Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan espouses the position that the Rule is part of the
fourteenth amendment limitation on government, and thus the erroneous admission of
evidence constitutes error of a constitutional dimension.
134. This protection is in the form of effectuating the constitutional guarantees
by excluding the evidence in all circumstances. See generally Oaks, note 121 supra.
135. Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 75-77 (1978).
136. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 496-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See Gannett
Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("excludes un-
doubted truth from the truth-finding processes").
137. See notes 152-71 infra and accompanying text.
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confessions are excluded even when independent evidence exists to
corroborate the statements and thus demonstrate their reliability. 3 '
Similarly, "hard" evidence is not excluded because of its lack of pro-
bative value, but because it is "inconsistent with ethical standards
and destructive of personal liberty."'39 Evidence is excluded because
of the unlawful methods employed. When it results from an indepen-
dent source, however, free of taint, the court permits its
admission. 4 ' Clearly, the original reasons for the Rule were in
response to the unlawful methods employed in gathering the
evidence, and not the truth or falsity of the evidence. Criticism of
the Rule for excluding the truth is based on rationales other than
the normative purposes of integrity and confidence.'
Besides the normative purposes for the Exclusionary Rule
there is the deterrence theory, 4 ' which is the foundation for another
real issue for skeptics of the Rule's continued vitality. Recent deci-
sions have placed greater emphasis on the deterrence theory."'
However, there is authority disparaging the deterrent effect of the
Rule." Deterrence is a factual rationale for the Rule, that is, the
fact that unlawfully seized evidence will be excluded deters official
misconduct by removing any incentive for violating the rights of
others. Still, the strong normative purposes for the Rule implicate
"constitutional policies [which] should be more than mere reflections
of ideological winds.""' A changing emphasis towards factual
138. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitu-
tionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inad-
missable under the Due Process Clause even though the statements con-
tained in them may be independantly established as true. Coerced confes-
sions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency.
Id. at 173. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959). "The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that
the police must obey the law while enforcing the law." Id. at 320-21. See also Kamisar,
supra note 135, at 77-78 (the court must not sanction police misconduct by admitting
evidence, even if verified).
139. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
140. E.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. at 341; Silverthorn Lumber Co.
v. United States, 251 U.S. at 392 (1920).
141. See notes 156-67 infra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 168-71 infra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 116-20 supra and accompanying text.
144. See Oaks, supra note 121, at 667-72. Oaks also concludes that the nor-
mative purposes for the Rule have little effect on its application.
145. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681, 726 (1974).
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premises should not, without more, be sufficient grounds for reject-
ing the Rule. Empirical data is required to determine whether the
deterrence rationale has any basis in fact for application of the Rule,
or whether it fails to serve the deterrence function.' If data
demonstrating a lack of deterrent value can be obtained, the Rule is
likely to undergo considerable change although this would be
disregarding the other normative purposes for the Rule.
Greater than the suspected lack of deterrent value, the
strongest criticism of the Exclusionary Rule is concerned with the
benefits and relief provided by the Rule. The Rule is applied when a
court must resolve a "conflict between two fundamental interests of
society; its interest in prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its
interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from be-
ing abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement."'4 7
But the Rule operates as a remedial device, implementing constitu-
tional guarantees by excluding the evidence from judicial pro-
ceedings rather than striking to prevent the violation itself.' Ap-
plication of the Rule appears, to some critics, to have value only for
the criminal defendant and not for society because it "offers no
relief whatever to victims of overzealous police work who never ap-
pear in court.""' In addition, the Rule's purpose "is not to redress
the injury to the privacy of the search victim [but to] effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches
and seizures."'" 0 This reflects a preference for the deterrence ra-
tionale for the Rule. If the Rule fails to perform that function, its
value to society would be illusory."'
146. See Oaks, note 121 supra. But see Cannon, note 178 supra. Canon's article
is a critique of Oaks' article, and he finds insufficient evidence to discredit the deter-
rent effect of the Rule.
147. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
148. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
149. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 501 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See id. at 536
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Stewart urges a modification of the Rule because the public
interest is shortchanged with little equity on the defendant's side for exclusion. Oaks,
supra note 121, at 736. The victim of an illegal search that reveals nothing is not
directly aided by the Rule, only the defendant is aided.
150. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. Calandra stressed that the
Rule was for deterring police misconduct, and thus should not be applied to grand jury
proceedings because of the lack of deterrent effect when used in those secret pro-
ceedings. But see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943). In McNabb, the Court
did not rely on the idea that the Rule was for the defendant's protection except in
cases of "bad" confessions. Rather, the Rule was to prevent the government from prof-
iting from its own misdeeds. Thus society should benefit from the Rule, not just the
defendant.
151. But this fails to consider the normative functions of the Exclusionary Rule
and their fulfillment. Also, the quantity of searches either not made to avoid applica-
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Although critics may find the Rule's value illusory, they largely
overlook the normative functions of the Rule. Most of the criticism
of the Rule is premised on the failure of the deterrent purpose of
the Rule to adequately serve societal interests. However, this does
not give credence to the sociological values reinforced through the
normative functions. Basically, the Court is moving towards the fac-
tual aspects of the Rule more closely related to the Court's percep-
tion of the Rule's effectiveness in enforcing the Constitution.
Because of this shifting emphasis, the rationale for the Rule should
be evaluated, and the rights which are implicated.
Rationale of the Exclusionary Rule
First amendment rights of access are implicit in the rationale
of the Exclusionary Rule. Three basic purposes for the Exclusionary
Rule can be deduced from the Supreme Court decisions applying the
Rule.'" Two of these purposes, judicial integrity" and public con-
fidence,'" are normative functions which require uniform standards
of exclusion of all tainted evidence. The third purpose for the Rule,
deterrence," is essentially a factual role which assumes that exclu-
sion will deter misconduct. The public right to know warrants a
right of access to observe the Rule's design. Additionally, the goals
of the Rule may be furthered by a right of access. This tacit right to
know is a feature of the Rule which translates into a need for open
suppression proceedings.
One rationale for the Exclusionary Rule is the "imperative of
judicial integrity," which mandates that the courts not become ac-
cessories to official misconduct.'" When evidence obtained through a
fourth amendment violation is offered in a criminal prosecution, the
courts "cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered use of
tion of the Rule, or made properly because of the Rule's surveillance, cannot be
reliably determined.
152. See 1 W. LAFAvE. supra note 120, at § 1.1(f).
153. See notes 156-62 infra and accompanying text.
154. See notes 163-67 infra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 168-71 infra and accompanying text.
156. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). Accord, United States v.
Peltier, 422 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan interprets judicial integrity
as the "core value" of the Exclusionary Rule. Id. at 553 n.13. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). "Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a
flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed
to stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobediance of
the law." Id. at 345.
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the fruits of such invasions."'151 Similarly, if involuntary confessions
were admitted as evidence in criminal cases, the courts would be
violating the accusatorial processes in which the defendant is charged
with a crime and the prosecution must carry the burden of proof.
An inquisitorial system would result," in which the "defendant"
would bear the burden of convincing his examiners of his innocence.
The safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-
incrimination would thus be lost, because admitting the tainted
evidence indirectly sanctions the objectionable methods employed.159
"To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial deci-
sion a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions
of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action."''
When the defendant objects to the admission of evidence
allegedly procured in violation of constitutional rights, "it is the
duty of the trial court to entertain a motion for the exclusion of such
evidence and to hold a hearing . . . to determine whether such mo-
tion should be granted or denied."'' If the court finds that the of-
ficials' conduct violated the defendant's constitutional rights, then
the court must grant the suppression motion and thereby enhance
the credibility of the constitutional guarantee in the eyes of the
public. 2 Therefore, the Exclusionary Rule provides for judicial
review of official conduct to protect society's constitutional rights,
and preserves judicial integrity by requiring exclusion of tainted
evidence rather than reinforcing the misconduct by admission of
the evidence.
Closely related to the rationale of judicial integrity is the pur-
pose of maintaining public trust in government by not allowing the
government to profit in court from its unlawful behavior. A classic
articulation of this rationale, exhibiting a strong sense of social
values, was made by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States:"
157. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
158. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).
159. See Kamisar, note 135 supra.
160. Weeks v. United States., 232 U.S. at 394.
161. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. at 346. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e).
162. See Oaks, supra note 121, at 756. While a critique of the Rule, this article
does recognize its value as a normative standard.
163. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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Decency, security and liberty alike demand that
government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of
conduct that are commands to the citizens. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be im-
perilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For
good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anar-
chy. To declare that government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doc-
trine this court should resolutely set its face."'
This doctrine, that the government is above the law, permits
unlawful conduct to be rewarded unless checked by the exclusion of
evidence. Exclusion denies the fruits of official misconduct. 6'
Reliability of the evidence is not a factor; rather, it is the "historical
function of assuring appropriate procedure before liberty is curtailed
or life is taken" that requires exclusion.' Misconduct violates that pro-
cedure, and the evidence thereby obtained should not be used against
the victim of the violation. Exclusion enhances public trust in govern-
ment by demonstrating the integrity of the courts and their ability to
nurture faith in the constitutional guarantees."7
Rather than seeking to repair the effects of misconduct, the
third rationale for the Exclusionary Rule is directed at prevention of
misconduct. Exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence "is calculated
to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect
for the constitutional guarantee in the only effectively available
164. Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis was dissenting from the
Court's admission of wiretap evidence. The Court failed to find a search and seizure,
while Brandeis looked to the illegality of the wiretap itself. Also in dissent, Justice
Holmes disagreed with admission of the fruits of illegal acts, since it was "less evil
that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part." Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. See Oaks, supra note 121, 667-72. As a normative device, the Rule pro-
vides correct standards for the law.
166. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. at 55. Watts applied the Due Process Exclu-
sionary Rule to exclude a coerced confession. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
167. But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Reversal by federal courts
after at least two state courts have rejected a defendant's fourth amendment claims
could create disrespect for the law and administration of justice. Id. at 491.
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way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."'" Because
unlawfully seized evidence will be excluded, officials will seek to
observe constitutional rights in furtherance of the interest in
convicting criminals. If the evidence were admitted, the anomaly
would arise of exonerating police misconduct because it serves the
interest in convicting criminals, contrary to the adage that two
wrongs do not make a right."9 Since the Court has found the Rule to
be "the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal
context,""17 recent decisions of the Court have emphasized deter-
rence as the primary goal of the Exclusionary Rule."'
PUBLIC ACCESS TO PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
Public access rights to trials are now fairly well established
under the law.17 ' However, the issue of access rights to pretrial pro-
ceedings is not yet so clearly decided. "Under the sixth amendment
the Court has denied any such right.'"1 The possibility of public
access rights under the first amendment has yet to be considered by
the Court.' 4 In addition to analyzing these aspects of a pretrial ac-
cess right, the unique characteristics of the suppression hearing and
their impact on a public right of access to pretrial proceedings are
discussed.'
7
The Public Trial Guarantee Does Not Extend to Pretrial
Proceedings
In extending sixth amendment guarantees to pretrial stages,
the primary concern is the protection of the fair trial of a defendant.
For example, the right to counsel means that "the accused is
168. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 217. This rationale alters the Rule's
focus. Instead of a remedial device employed to preserve a distinction between right
and wrong in the public's eye, the Rule penalizes misconduct through exclusion. This
threatened penalty hopefully will encourage observation of constitutional rights.
169. While a victim of an unlawful seizure could sue the offending officials, it is
highly improbable in the case of a criminal defendant seeking to avoid additional con-
flicts. The prohibitive cost of a suit could also be a deterrent to civil actions.
170. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 12.
171. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531
(1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Accord, Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring). But see United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (deterrence is "at best only
a hoped-for effect of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective").
172. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. .. 100 S. Ct. 2814
(1980); see notes 33-92 supra and accompanying text.
173. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
174. See notes 186-205 infra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 206-28 infra and accompanying text.
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guaranteed that he does not stand alone against the State at any
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where
counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."7 For this reason the right has been extended to all "critical
stages" 7 of a criminal prosecution, and also to custodial interroga-
tions 78 because of the necessity for an effective representative at
the trial itself. 79 However, this extension of the right to counsel is
not made under the aegis of the sixth amendment. Pretrial counsel
is required to further the constitutional right to counsel at trial and
the fairness of a defendant's trial.18 In the same manner, the public
trial right should not -apply to pretrial proceedings under the sixth
amendment.
Rather than extending to pretrial stages under the sixth
amendment public trial right, a right to open pretrial proceedings
must benefit the fair trial right of the defendant.18 Certainly there
is a possibility of persecution in pretrial hearings which could harm
a defendant's fair trial. Since there is no jury to insure against that
possibility the defendant must rely on open proceedings. However,
the public trial right as applied to pretrial hearings does not affect
the quality of the trial itself. If the defendant perceives prejudice
176. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). "The security of that
right is as much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment-the right of the accused to speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury .. " Id. at 226-27.
177. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970) (preliminary hearing).
178. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964).
179. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (dictum). "The
guarantees afforded a criminal defendant at trial also protect him at certain stages
before the actual trial. . . .but the 'trial' guarantees that have been applied to the
'pretrial' stage of the criminal process are similarly designed to protect the fairness of
the trial itself." Id. at 238-39. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). In Coleman, the
Court offered several benefits in providing counsel before trial. Some of the means by
which an attorney can assist a defendant include: exposing fatal defects in the State's
case, developing impeachment tools, preserving valuable testimony, discovery of the
State's case and preparing for trial, and arguing for examinations of the accused or
bail.
180. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Court did not extend
the sixth amendment right to counsel per se to pretrial proceedings. Instead, a deter-
mination of the need for counsel depended on "whether potential substantial prejudice
to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel
to help avoid that prejudice." Id. at 227. But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970). Preliminary hearings are part of a criminal prosecution within the meaning of
the sixth amendment. Therefore, the right of counsel should attach as a sixth amend-
ment right. Id. at 11-13 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 14-15 (Douglas, J., concurring).
181. See notes 176-80 supra and accompanying text.
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arising from open pretrial proceedings, then his motion for closure
should be granted since the public pretrial "right" is not constitu-
tionally grounded.
The Supreme Court has expressly held that the public trial
guarantee provides no public right of access to pretrial suppression
hearings.' Closure of a pretrial hearing was held an appropriate
remedy to prevent adverse publicity from harming the fair trial
guarantee." Since the public trial guarantee is personal to the ac-
cused, closure did not violate any constitutional principles under the
sixth amendment."' Although the Court did recognize that public in-
terests in open proceedings exist under the sixth amendment, 8 5 it
gave priority to the interests of the defendant in a fair trial. Since
the public does not have a sixth amendment right of access, public
access rights to pretrial proceedings must originate elsewhere.
A First Amendment Access Right to Pretrial Proceedings
Public interests formed the foundation for a public right of
access to trials.' These interests included public participation'8 7 and
a limited right to acquire information. 8 Open trials enable the
public to observe the system, so that participation can be intelligent-
ly exercised' and disclosure of the truth be assured.' Finally, ac-
cess preserves confidence in the courts, and promotes acceptance of
the courts and the values they represent.'9 ' Just as these factors
contribute to form a public access right to trials, a more persuasive
claim for a public access right to pretrial proceedings arises from
the first amendment.
The basic similarities between pretrial proceedings and trials
vindicate a right of access.' Pretrial proceedings involve many of
182. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 379-81. But see id. at
418-33 (dissenting opinion).
183. "To safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an
affirmative duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity .... Closure of
pretrial proceedings is often one of the most effective methods that a trial judge can
employ. ... Id at 378-79 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 379-81.
185. Id. at 382-83.
186. See notes 33-92 supra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 34-40 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 48-61 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text; see also notes 215-21 infra
and accompanying text.
192. [Tihe suppression hearing resembles and relates to the full trial in
almost every particular. Evidence is presented by means of live
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the same public officials who are involved at the trial stage,'93 which
indicates that the pretrial stage itself is a governmental process.
This means that the public has a participation right. Because these
proceedings may be the only judicial proceedings to take place dur-
ing a criminal prosecution, the public right to know what transpires
therein is especially acute. '94 Only with access can the press acquire
the information necessary for effective public participation in the
system."'
Because access to information is required for the public to in-
telligently participate in governmental affairs, the issue of access to
pretrial proceedings is a significant concern. Denial of access to
pretrial stages is a more extreme limitation on the public right to
receive information than a prior restraint,'" as no information can
reach press or public. Scrutiny of public officials should certainly en-
compass their conduct at any "critical stage"'97 of a criminal pro-
ceeding. Moreover, how the courts resolve the legal issues raised at
those stages may determine the outcome of the case. Thus, the
public should be able to observe those decisions, gaining the infor-
mation required for effective participation.
In addition to the participation aspect, procedural similarities
in calling witnesses and presenting testimony suggest a right of
access to assure a complete and truthful record.'98 Open proceedings
should enhance this function even at pretrial stages by improving
the quality of testimony and inducing witnesses to come forward.'99
testimony, witnesses are sworn, and those witnesses are subject to cross-
examination. Determination of the ultimate issue depends in most cases
upon the trier of fact's evaluation of the evidence, and credibility is often
crucial. Each side has incentive to prevail ...
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 434 (dissenting opinion).
193. For example, the prosecutor and judge are likely to be the same persons
at both stages, or some other public official will act in their stead. In either event, the
public interest in scrutinizing the officials' performance is still present. See notes 63-65
supra and accompanying text.
194. If the defendant prevails, he will have dealt the prosecution's case a
serious, perhaps fatal, blow; the proceeding often then will be dismissed
or negotiated on terms favorable to the defense. If the prosecution suc-
cessfully resists the motion to suppress, the defendant may have little
hope of success at trial (especially where a confession is in issue), with the
result that the likelihood of a guilty plea is substantially increased.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 434 (dissenting opinion).
195. See notes 48-52, 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
196. See notes 42-47 supra and accompanying text.
197. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. at 10.
198. See note 192 supra.
199. See notes 66-68 supra and accompanying text (although dealing with
trials, the underlying premise should apply equally to pretrial proceedings). Publicity
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Ascertaining the truth is an important role for the courts, and the
public interest in the truth is present throughout a criminal pro-
ceeding.'
Access can also fulfill sociological functions at the pretrial
stages. Confidence in the courts as a means of dispensing justice can
hardly be encouraged when the public is unable to observe and
reach its own conclusions. 10' In fact, closure could spawn the kind of
"secret proceedings" which breed distrust.2 Furthermore, the
pretrial stages of a criminal prosecution can provide an initial outlet
for the community reaction following the commission of a crime. 03
Access to these proceedings generates acceptance of the courts and
the values they espouse.0 '
These public interests which justify a right of access to pretrial
proceedings under the first amendment may conflict with a defen-
dant's sixth amendment fair trial right. Suppression hearings pre-
sent one such situation. In resolving this conflict at suppression
hearings, the Supreme Court has emphasized the fair trial right of
the defendant.0 0 However, the Court has not examined this issue in
terms of the peculiar benefits which are reinforced by access to sup-
pression hearings.
Public Access to Exclusionary Rule Hearings
Exclusionary Rule hearings pose a conflict between the fair
trial rights of a defendant and first amendment rights of the public.
An open suppression hearing increases the risk of inadmissible
evidence reaching prospective jurors and affecting their perspec-
acts as a "testimonial safeguard, as a mechanism to encourage the parties, the
witnesses, and the court to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of their
duties and in providing a means whereby unknown witnesses may become known,
[and is] just as important for the suppression hearing as [it is] for the full trial." Gan-
nett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 434 (dissenting opinion).
200. Another aspect of the truth, unrelated to the prosecution of the defen-
dant, involves the public right to know about official misconduct. See notes 222-25 in-
fra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
202. See note 72 supra.
203. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text. Certainly public pretrial
proceedings could serve a similar therapeutic function as public trials. "To work effec-
tively, it is important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the appearance of
justice,'" Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, __ U.S. at __, 100 S. Ct. at 2825,
and open pretrial hearings better provide that appearance than do closed proceedings.
204. See note 78 supra
205. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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tives at the trial.' Also, the defendant may be subjected to adverse
publicity arising from the pretrial proceedings. 7 On the other hand,
the rationales of preserving judicial integrity, perpetuating public
confidence and deterring official misconduct 28 are more readily
justified when suppression hearings are open to the public.
One risk to the fair trial of a defendant resulting from open
hearings concerns the publication of inadmissible prejudicial infor-
mation. In Jackson v. Denno," the Supreme Court held that a jury
should not determine the voluntariness of a confession, but the
defendant should have a hearing with a judicial ruling on the ques-
tion. This is necessary because a lay jury cannot realize the prob-
lems requiring exclusion of "bad" confessions when corroborating
evidence of the confessions' truth is available. Thus, a judge must
determine the admissibility of the evidence, although not necessarily
in the absence of the jury.1°
When pretrial hearings are employed to answer questions of
admissibility, open proceedings raise the spectre of potential jurors
hearing the inadmissible evidence and using that knowledge in
reaching a guilty verdict at trial. However, suppression motions are
directed at questions of official misconduct, and not to the guilt or
innocence of a defendant. Since the substance of the evidence is
irrelevant to this inquiry, the court should be able to exclude it as
irrelevant, or prejudicial, during the pretrial hearing. This would
avert the dangers of prejudicing potential jurors, while still permit-
ting access to the judicial proceedings.
Besides the danger of prejudicial evidence being published,
there is a related concern for adverse publicity which might be
amplified by pretrial hearings. The alternatives which the Court has
postulated to minimize the dangers of publicity at trial may be just
as applicable to pretrial proceedings.2 Yet closure has been held an
206. See notes 209-11 infra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 212-14 infra and accompanying text.
208. See notes 157-71 supra and accompanying text.
209. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
210. See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (1967) (per curiam). In Pinto, the hearing
on the voluntariness of a confession was held in the presence of the jury. However, the
defense counsel, when asked, made no objection. Justice Fortas expressed reluctance
for this procedure, sensing that the jury was not likely to be independent in assessing
credibility once the judge ruled for admissibility based on the evidence of volun-
tariness.
211. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. at 543-44.
212. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 563-64; Sheppard v. Max-
well, 384 U.S. at 358-61. Some of these measures include: change of venue, postpone-
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acceptable alternative. " Deferring the publication of prejudicial in-
formation disclosed at pretrial hearings until after the disposition of
the defendant's case increases the chances for impanelling an impar-
tial jury. Nevertheless, the court should assure itself that closure
will be an effective remedy before granting such a motion."'
Although there are risks to the fair trial of a defendant, public
access does offer some positive implications for fulfilling the pur-
poses of the Exclusionary Rule. Preservation of judicial integrity im-
plies more than the courts' own knowledge that the moral character
of the courts is intact. Rather than reinforcing misconduct, the
courts can disclaim any participation in unlawful acts which secure
tainted evidence by excluding the evidence from the trial.15 Public
participation requires access to determine which courts respect the
constitutional prohibitions protecting the people from unauthorized
official misconduct, so that those courts may be preserved."' If the
integrity of the courts is not apparent to the public, then acceptance
of the courts will be less likely.
Related to the integrity of the courts is the necessity for the
public to have confidence in the system. Open proceedings enhance
trust, while secrecy creates distrust.217 Public confidence demands
assurances that the government will not be permitted to profit in
the courts after overstepping the bounds of the law. Access con-
tributes to making these assurances by allowing the public to see
that unlawfully obtained evidence is excluded by the courts."' Cer-
ment of the trial, careful voir dire of jurors, emphatic use of jury instructions to con-
fine its decision to the evidence presented, insulating witnesses, and forbidding out of
court statements on prejudicial matters by witnesses and participants. Sequestration
is one of the few inapplicable methods, but its use is infrequent in any event.
213. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 379.
214. If the information disclosed at the hearing is already known to the public,
closure will have little effect. The court would also have to determine the probable im-
pact of the information on the public. Cf. note 44 supra (determining the basis for a
"gag" order).
215. See notes 156-62 supra and accompanying text.
216. On the other hand, public reaction might be adverse to "liberal" judges
who allow criminals to escape punishment because of legal loopholes. Even if this is
the case, the courts should still strive to preserve their integrity as a matter of self-
respect.
217. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
218. Accord, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing, Douglas and Marshall, JJ., joining).
The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals
of enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct-that the government would not profit from its
1981]
Kern: Peering into the Courtroom: An Analysis of the Public Interest
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
404 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 15
tainly confidence in the law, and the system, would deteriorate if of-
ficials were able to disregard the rights of the people and use the
fruits of misconduct in judicial proceedings. 1 9
Both judicial integrity and public confidence are basically nor-
mative rationales for the Rule.2" Misconduct can have a disturbing
effect on the public. The Rule seeks to repair that effect by
demonstrating to the public that the character of the courts remains
exemplary in refusing to admit unlawfully seized evidence. In ex-
cluding evidence, the courts are also stressing the importance of the
constitutional rights which were violated. Knowledge of the stan-
dards applied by the courts will instill a sense of the values which
the Exclusionary Rule protects.21
Public knowledge of misconduct also serves to advance the goal
of preventing that misconduct. In Wolf v. Colorado,12 the Court
acknowledged public reaction as a potent force in deterring unlawful
conduct. Obviously, the public cannot react to misconduct unless the
means are available to discover the misconduct. Suppression hear-
ings may be the first exposure of unlawful official acts to public
scrutiny. Thus, denying access to those hearings detracts from the
lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government.
Id. at 357.
219. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). There is a "deep-rooted feel-
ing that the police, must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought
to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." Id. at 320-21. The use of the
Rule reflects this feeling in the courts.
220. See notes 156-67 supra and accompanying text.
221. These values include: personal security and privacy, sanctity of the home,
trust in the courts as a source of protection from government abuse of power, belief in
our system of laws which limits the extent of power of the government, and others not
listed here. However, this notion of values protected by the Rule is more reminiscent
of the rationales of judicial integrity and confidence than deterrence.
222. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
There are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtain-
ed by the federal police which are less compelling in the case of police
under state or local authority. The public opinion of a community can far
more effectively be exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of
police directly responsible to the community itself than can local opinion,
sporadically aroused, be brought to bear upon remote authority per-
vasively exerted throughout the country.
Id at 32-33. Although suggesting that this lack of deterrence in state courts was a
reason for rejecting the Rule's extension to state proceedings, the Court did not men-
tion the deterrence value when applying the Rule to all court proceedings in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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public right to know about those acts, and hinders public participa-
tion in preventing misconduct. Prosecutors and police officials would
certainly seek to prevent that which results in exclusion of evidence,
but are likely to be more responsive to the public pressures objec-
ting to the misconduct which caused the exclusion.22
In addition to the public interest in preventing misconduct, the
deterrence rationale also implicates the public interest in the arrest
and conviction of criminals.2 ' Misconduct can result in incomplete
records, with truthful evidence being excluded.225 The public has an
interest in achieving a complete and truthful record at trial, and
thus has a right to know if the record is deficient in any respect
because of official misconduct. Only then can the public take the
necessary steps to prevent misconduct and insure that prosecutions
are based on all relevant evidence. Some of the exceptions which the
Court has found to the application of the Rule can be rationalized by
the lack of public participation in preventing the misconduct. For ex-
ample, grand jury proceedings are not open to the public, so there
can be no public knowledge of misconduct that could assist the
deterrent rationale. The Court, in rejecting the use of the Rule in
those proceedings, recognized its minimal deterrent value." ° Delayed
application of the Rule also has only marginal deterrence value."z
Because state courts have determined that there was no misconduct,
public reaction to a federal court finding of misconduct would prob-
ably be diluted. The public is less likely to object to officials'
unlawful acts when the courts disagree on whether there were any
unlawful acts. Finally, the public is less likely to react to misconduct
when the officer did not have reasonable knowledge of the constitu-
tional violation.228 If the officer acted in a reasonable manner, it
would be unreasonable to expect the public to chastise his conduct.
223. "Any interest on the part of the prosecution in hiding police or pros-
ecutorical misconduct or ineptitude may coincide with the defendant's desire to keep
the proceedings private .. " Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 428 (dissen-
ting opinion). Whether the public reacts to the misconduct itself, or to a belief that the
defendant has benefitted from a legal technicality, the end result will be close scrutiny
of the participants by the public.
224. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
225. See notes 136-41 supra and accompanying text.
226. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). "As with any remedial
device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." Id. at 348.
227. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (rejecting the Rule in habeas cor-
pus petitions to federal courts after full hearings in state courts). Additionally, passage
of time makes it more difficult to identify the conduct as well as the actors.
228. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Brown v. Illinois, 422
U.S. at 610-12 (Powell, J., concurring). Powell saw greater deterrent effects when
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Summarizing the need for access to Exclusionary Rule hear-
ings, several first amendment concerns can be distinguished.2" The
right to know and participate in government is most strongly im-
plicated by the deterrent rationale for the Rule. Prevention of
misconduct demands public, as well as judicial, condemnation of that
misconduct. Sociological functions of access are more closely related
to the normative rationales of the Rule. Public awareness of integrity is
necessary to build confidence in the system. Additionally, the constitu-
tionally protected rights carry greater weight when the public can
observe how the Rule effectuates those guarantees. Without access,
the functions of the Rule would be debilitated. Judicial integrity
would be largely unperceived, and confidence cannot develop in
what is unknown. The public interest in participation would also be
repudiated, as well as the deterrent effects which the public can pro-
vide. These interests are not directed towards the defendant, but
towards the officials whose conduct creates a need for the Exclu-
sionary Rule.
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, judicial proceedings have been open to the
public. However, the Supreme Court has begun only recently to ar-
ticulate a constitutional basis for that tradition. The sixth amend-
ment public trial guarantee may suggest a public right to open
courts, but it remains a constitutional safeguard for the defendant
rather than an independent right of the public. A constitutional
right of access to trials does arise under the first amendment.
Although the public right of access is now explicit for the trial stage
of a judicial proceeding, pretrial stages are not yet included.
Closure of a suppression hearing has been justified to protect
the fair trial right of a defendant. In so doing, the Court relied on
the sixth amendment, which is primarily for the protection of the
abuses were flagrant rather than minor. Public reaction is more likely to arise in those
cases of egregious misconduct, than those in which only the courts can determine the
violation.
229. The Court briefly addressed these concerns in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. at 391-93. However, such a right of access was deemed adequately pro-
tected by the opportunity to study the transcript of the hearing. Id at 393. While this
may be one means to harmonize the conflicts between defendant and public, some
questions must be answered. One question is whether the transcript has the same im-
pact or informative value as would the acquisition of first-hand knowledge. Another is
whether the fact of closure could "cause a reaction that the system at best has failed
and at worst has been corrupted." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, - U.S. at
-, 100 S. Ct. at 2825.
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defendant and not conducive to independent public rights. In spite
of the legitimate interests of a defendant in preserving his fair trial,
the Court should still carefully consider the public interests present
at pretrial stages. Unnecessary closures are essentially a denial of
any public right of access to pretrial proceedings.
While the Supreme Court has not yet acknowledged a first
amendment public access right, public interests in open courts de-
mand that such a right be recognized for judicial proceedings. The
public certainly has a right to know what transpires in the courts.
With this knowledge, the public can more effectively exercise the
right of participation in government, and insure that its interests
are protected by the courts. Although suppression hearings may
present potent reasons for closure to protect a defendant, public in-
terests also exist which are opposed to closure.
Exclusionary Rule hearings inquire into the acquisition of
evidence, and determine the admissibility of the evidence. Exclusion
of unlawfully obtained evidence should instill public confidence in
the courts as protectors of constitutional liberties, and preserve the
integrity of the judiciary. Neither of these can be fulfilled without
public knowledge of the proceedings. Critics of the Rule who do not
perceive any societal benefit overlook these important rationales for
the Rule.
Another rationale for the Exclusionary Rule, deterrence of of-
ficial misconduct, implies a need for public knowledge and participa-
tion to compel respect for the constitutional rights of all people.
Secret proceedings, such as grand juries, fail to expose misconduct
to the public. Denying access thus serves to limit the potential for
the Rule as a deterrent to constitutional violations.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court should recognize that the
public right of access to trials must apply equally to all criminal pro-
ceedings. Public interests are ingrained in pretrial suppression hear-
ings just as they are rooted in the trial itself. The effects of closures
on the public right of participation and public confidence in the
courts must be analyzed when restrictions on access are at issue.
Timothy L. Kern
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